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Abstract
Recently, there has been a growing interest in network research, especially
in these fields of biology, computer science, and sociology. It is natural to
address complex financial issues such as the European sovereign debt crisis
from the perspective of network. In this article, we construct a network
model according to the debt–credit relations instead of using the conventional
methodology to measure the default risk. Based on the model, a risk index
is examined using the quarterly report of consolidated foreign claims from
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and debt/GDP ratios among
these reporting countries. The empirical results show that this index can
help the regulators and practitioners not only to determine the status of
interconnectivity but also to point out the degree of the sovereign debt default
risk. Our approach sheds new light on the investigation of quantifying the
systemic risk.
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1. Introduction
The stability of the financial system and the potential of systemic risks
to alter the functioning of this system have long been important for central
banks and related research communities. Thus, guarding against systemic
risk in the financial system is an emergent issue. However, specifically defin-
ing this type of risk and managing it is difficult. Therefore, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the National Research Council’s Board on
Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications held a conference to stimulate
fresh ideas on systemic risk in May 2006 [? ]. The conference attracted more
than 100 experts from 22 countries, representing banks, regulators, invest-
ment firms, US national laboratories, government agencies, and universities.
This conference proposed the new directions for understanding systemic risk.
A comprehensive survey of understanding systemic risk can be referred to [?
] and [? ].
Some external events, such as recessions, wars, civil unrest, environmental
catastrophes or financial crisis, have the potential to depress the value of a
banks’ assets so severely that the system fails. In the wake of the global
financial crisis that began in 2007, there is increasing recognition of the need
to address risk at the systemic level, as distinct from focusing on individual
banks [? ] [? ] [? ] [? ]. Sovereign debt defaults often make the financial
system unstable, causing further systemic risk. A number of studies have
been conducted on sovereign debt crises and the policy responses to these
sovereign defaults [? ] following the sovereign debt crises in the 1980s.
However, a little comparative empirical work has been done on the sovereign
debt crises based on the macroeconomic and systemic perspectives. In this
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article, we provide an another view to analyze this kind of issue on sovereign
debts from the network prospective.
Currently, the increasingly complicated and globally interlinked financial
markets are not immune to such systemic threats. Three questions immedi-
ately arise: (i) Does globalization make the world too interconnected? (ii) Is
there a way to be immunized from the systemic threats? (iii) How can we
find a proper index to measure systemic risk? In the following, we first fo-
cus on the role of growth in generating sovereign debt failure and instability.
Second, we provide a systemic risk index to measure sovereign debt from the
perspective of financial networks. Finally, we implement the empirical study
through the quarterly data of consolidated foreign claims from the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) and debt/GDP ratios among the reporting
countries. This index not only can provide the regulators and practitioners
with the status of interconnectivity but also can point out the degree of the
default risk. Moreover, it shields light on quantifying the systemic risk of the
world.
2. Connectivity of the sovereign debt
To answer the question “Does the globalization make the world too inter-
connected?,” we use the quarterly report of consolidated foreign claims from
BIS. The foreign claims by nationality of the reporting banks are the ulti-
mate risk basis consisting of 20 countries from 2005 Q1 to 2011 Q1. The con-
solidated banking statistics reports banks’ on-balance sheet financial claims
on the rest of the world, thus providing a measure of the risk exposures
of lenders’ national banking systems. The quarterly data cover contractual
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lending by the head office and all its branches and subsidiaries on a worldwide
consolidated basis.
We plot the debt–credit relations among these countries through FNA1,
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. FNA is an analytics platform that can help
financial institutions and regulators better manage and understand financial
data with network analysis and visualization. The nodes are represented as
these 20 countries. The ties denote the debt–credit relations between any two
of them. Thickness and thinness represent the debt–credit amount. Figure
1 shows the network structure of sovereign debts in 2005 Q1.
<Insert Fig. 1 here>
Figure 2 shows that for 2009 Q4.
<Insert Fig. 2 here>
These countries became more inter-connective from 2005 Q1 to 2009 Q4.
The connectivity of the world has indeed intensified during these past years’
globalization.
3. Network structure of sovereign debts
The inability of previous approaches to reproduce statistical regularities
observed empirically in network structures justifies our pursuit of a complex
systems approach that may provide predictions for large-scale networks. Sim-
ple amplification mechanisms can dominate the network dynamics at large,
despite the best intentions of the agents. Economic networks are subject to
1http://www.fna.fi/
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amplifications that may result from the redistribution of the load if one node
fails.
Here, we consider a network structure consisting of two parts: one part is
the set of the nodes, V , in which N countries belong, and the other part is the
sovereign debt–credit relationship among these countries, E. The network
structure of these sovereign debts is formed and denoted by
G ≡ (V,E). (1)
We further assume the following:
Assumption 1. For an arbitrary node i ∈ V , the default probability of node
i is defined as pi.
Assumption 2. Let qij be the probability that node i defaults such that its
linkage node j defaults where j 6= i and qii = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Assumption 3. The loss of the node i is li.
According to these assumptions, the following properties can be immedi-
ately obtained:
1. The default transition matrix (DTM) of the network system is
DTM =

1 q12 . . . q1N
q21 1 . . . q2N
...
...
...
...
qN1 . . . . . . 1
 ∗ Adj.(E),
where Adj.(E) represents the adjacency matrix of E.
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2. The network default probability (NDP) is
NDP = DP ∗DTM,
where
DP =
(
p1, . . . , pN
)
.
3. The network expected loss (NEL) is
NEL = NDP ∗ L,
where
L =
(
l1, . . . , lN
)′
.
4. Sovereign debts and systemic risk
Although systemic risk is a difficult concept to define precisely, a better
understanding of systemic risk is given by [? ]: “If a single node fails, it
may force other nodes to fail as well, which may eventually lead to failure
cascades and the breakdown of the system, denoted as systemic risk.”
According to the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
(PCIAA), there are two key assessments for measuring systemic risk: the “too
big to fail” (TBTF) and the “too interconnected to fail” (TICTF) tests2. The
TBTF test is the traditional analysis for assessing the risk of required gov-
ernment intervention. TBTF can be measured in terms of an institution’s
size relative to the national and international marketplaces, market share
concentration, and competitive barriers to entry or how easily a product can
2http://www.pciaa.net/
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be substituted. The TICTF test is a measure of the likelihood and amount
of medium-term net negative effect on the larger economy of an institution’s
failure to conduct its ongoing business. The effect is measured beyond the
institution’s products and activities to include the economic multiplier of all
other commercial activities dependent specifically on that institution. The
effect is also dependent on how correlated an institution’s business is with
other systemic risks.
Based on the two principles of PCIAA, finding such few economic vari-
ables to describe DP , DTM and L are difficult. We adopt two economic
variables which can be observed to proxy them and also determine the sys-
temic risk of these sovereign debts. We define systemic risk index (SRI)
as
SRI ≡
N∑
i=1
di·V (ki), (2)
where di and V (ki) represent the debt/GDP ratio and the functions of the
topological importance of node i, respectively. To describe the topological
importance of node i, the network centrality is proper. There are two kinds of
centrality measurements commonly be used in network theory: local measure
and non-local measure. The local measure indicates the degree centrality
or closeness centrality while the non-local measure denotes the betweenness
centrality or eigenvector centrality. Here, we use betweenness centrality to
measure the topological importance of node i. The betweenness centrality of
a node i, g(i), is given by the following expression:
g(i) =
∑
s 6=v 6=t
σst(i)
σst
, (3)
where σst is the total number of shortest paths from node s to node t, and
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σst(i) is the number of the paths that pass through i. We plot the time series
of SRI from 2005 Q1 to 2011 Q1 as shown in Figure 3.
<Insert Fig. 3 here>
Figure 3 indicates that there is a peak around 2010 Q2. Beginning late
2009, fears of a sovereign debt crisis developed among investors as a result
of the rising government debt levels around the world along with a wave
of downgrading of government debts in some European states. Concerns
intensified in early 2010 and thereafter, causing Europe’s finance ministers
on May 9, 2010 to approve a rescue package worth 750 billion euros aimed at
ensuring financial stability across Europe by creating the European Financial
Stability Facility.
5. Conclusions
[? ] argues the argument that the recent financial crisis has significant ex-
ternalities and systemic risks arising from the interconnectedness of financial
intermediary risk portfolios. The negative externality arises because interme-
diaries’ actions to diversify that are optimal for individual intermediary may
prove to be suboptimal for the society. This externality depends critically on
the distributional properties of the risks. The optimal social outcome involves
less risk–sharing, but also a lower probability for the massive collapse of inter-
mediaries. Furthermore, [? ] and [? ] study the time-lag cross-correlations
in multiple time series by using time-lag random matrix theory. The increase
in the level of globalization is related with the increase in cross-correlations
between different financial indices. The magnitude of the cross-correlations
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constitute “bad news” for the international investment managers who may
believe the risk is reduced by diversifying across countries.
In this paper, we propose a new index to measure the systemic risk in
financial systems. We use the quarterly report of consolidated foreign claims
from the BIS and debt/GDP ratios among these reporting countries. Our
result indicate that the index can really help to quantify the level of systemic
risk. The index could further be considered in a wide range of global market
or other network-typed financial systems.
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Figure 1: Network Structure of Sovereign Debt in 2009 Q4
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Figure 2: Network Structure of Sovereign Debt in 2009 Q4
11
Figure 3: Systemic Risk Index
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